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The last ten years has seen an explosion in uses of wireless technologies.
This, in turn, has driven a demand for "more" spectrum to support these
uses. A recent spectrum license auction by the Federal Communications
Commission ("Commission" or "FCC"), which regulates all civilian uses
of wireless technologies in the United States, generated almost $14 billion.'
The FCC's most recent report on the wireless industry found that all uses
of licensed wireless services, from mobile telephone use to fixed wireless
data services, continued to grow at an astounding rate.2
At the same time, a multibillion dollar industry has grown in the use of
"unlicensed" spectrum. 3 Part 15 of the Commission's rules permits manu-
facture of wireless devices for any use at very low powers on designated
1 Senior Vice President, Media Access Project. The author would like to thank Andrew
Jay Schwartzman, Professor Susan Crawford, and Professor Alan Feld for their valuable
comments and assistance.
1 News Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n., FCC's Advanced Wireless Services
(AWS) Spectrum Auction Concludes (Sept. 18, 2006), available at
htt 1 ://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-267467AI .pdf
In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, FCC 06-142, 5 (Sept. 29, 2006), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-06-142AI.pdf.
3 The term "unlicensed" is a misnomer that has created serious confusion in the regula-
tory treatment of these devices. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J.
REG. 242, 246 (2005). The term will, however, continue to appear throughout this article
because it has been so widely adopted in this use that attempting to substitute a more appro-
priate term proves both cumbersome and confusing.
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bands.4 In addition to a myriad of consumer devices, businesses, commu-
nity organizations, and state and local governments have begun using this
unlicensed spectrum to provide low-cost high-speed Internet access. Plans
exist to cover entire cities in unlicensed "wireless clouds" to provide al-
ways-on, ubiquitous broadband services.5 Because users of unlicensed
spectrum enjoy economies of scale and do not pay for expensive spectrum
licenses, unlicensed spectrum can offer a less expensive and more readily
deployable form of wireless service than licensed spectrum-albeit at a
trade off for quality of service and protection from interference. 6 With this
rise in intensive use, the FCC has also faced pressure to open more spec-
trum for unlicensed use.
As the pressure to find new licensed and unlicensed spectrum has grown,
conflict between these two interests has become a critical question to cur-
rent spectrum policy. The conflict increases because many advocates of
unlicensed use maintain that they can coexist on the same band as licensed
users in new ways that enhance the utility of unlicensed spectrum without
decreasing the utility of licensed services. Licensees and their supporters
contend that allowing unlicensed users to share frequency bands with li-
censees subjects licensed services to the possibility of harmful interference
and denies licensees the opportunity to fully exploit the value of their wire-
less licenses. Each side has put forth extensive arguments to explain why
one or the other approach maximizes consumer welfare, spurs economic
investment, and would therefore better serve the public.
As a practical matter, however, the FCC must first make a fundamental
determination-what does the law require? While determinations with
regard to the best overall public policy have obvious impact on how the
FCC should act, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended ("Commu-
nications Act") and First Amendment jurisprudence limit the FCC's scope.
These considerations created the current spectrum regulatory framework
and-barring any significant change by Congress-will shape FCC spec-
trum policy for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, it behooves those
seeking an answer to the FCC's multibillion dollar question to understand
the existing framework and the FCC's authority to change it.
Since the FCC revised its rules pertaining to unlicensed spectrum in
1989, it has employed a fairly straightforward hierarchy to determine the
level of protection afforded to users of wireless services.' The hierarchy
4 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 et seq. (2005).
5 Marguerite Reardon, Citywide Wi-Fi Spending Could Hit $3 Billion, CNET
NEWS.COM, Oct. 25, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-7351_3-6129655.html.
6 Id.
7 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rule Regarding Dedicated Short-Range
Communication Services in the 5.850-5.925 GHz Band (5.9 Band); Amendment of Parts 2
and 90 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate the 5.850-5.925 GHz Band to the Mobile
Service for Dedicated Short-Range Communications of Intelligent Transportation Services,
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generally illustrates a three-tiered approach to allocating spectrum for new
services: (1) traditional licensing, (2) licensing by rule, and (3) unlicensed
access.
8
Licensed spectrum users sit at the top of the ladder. The Communica-
tions Act and FCC regulation guarantee licensees operating within their
license terms protection from harmful interference from other man-made
sources.9 Next are users "licensed by rule."' Those users must not interfere
with traditionally licensed users, but still enjoy cerlain rights consistent
with the rules governing their services."
At the bottom of the hierarchy sit unlicensed spectrum users. Anyone
may use a "Part 15"12 device, which are devices certified by the FCC as
compliant with the appropriate rules, for any purpose. 13 In exchange for
this flexibility, unlicensed spectrum users must accept interference from
any source, and must not tamper with the device in any way that would
allow the device to violate the rules governing the unlicensed frequency
bands. 14 Part 15 devices have traditionally been relegated by rule to very
low power emissions; the highest power Part 15 devices are confined to
only a few frequency bands.
15
This article argues that First Amendment principles, combined with
changes in wireless technology, dictate a shift from a process in which
primary consideration is granted to licensed users in favor of an approach
that puts licensed and unlicensed users on equal footing. Indeed, given the
strong First Amendment and public policy benefits of creating a world in
which all citizens can speak through the public airwaves, rather than one in
which the public must rely on a handful of government-licensed intermedi-
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23,136, at 1[52-54 (Nov. 7, 2002)
(describing the hierarchical relationship among spectrum uses).
8 Id.
9 Licensed operators may maintain their own hierarchy of "primary" and "secondary"
services. The hierarchy is illustrated in the context of low power FM and non-exclusive
licensing. Low power FM licensees are secondary to full power FM licensees. See 47
C.F.R. § 73.809 (2005) (requiring low power FM to avoid interference with full power FM
station). Bands designated for non-exclusive use are subject to "first in time, first in ight"
rules giving primacy to the first licensee. See §101.147(a)(20) (subjecting new frequency
assignments to secondary treatment relative to those already using the band).
1o See, e.g., §§ 95.201-95.224.
11 Id.
12 Unlicensed devices are known as "Part 15" devices, so named for the part of the Code
of Federal Regulations governing their use. See § 15.1. A cordless telephone is one example
of a Part 15 device. See § 15.214.
'" See id. §§15.1, 15.5, 15.21.
14 id.
15 Generally, the highest power Part 15 devices are of 1 watt or less, and are confined to
"junk bands"-frequencies regarded as undesirable for licensed services. Gerald R. Faul-
haber, The Question of Spectrum Technology, Management, and Regime Change, 4 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 123, 139 (2005-06).
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aries, the FCC should make every effort to foster the development of tech-
nologies that facilitate non-exclusive unlicensed use.
In resolving the question set forth above, the FCC should, as a general
rule, favor enhancing unlicensed spectrum access rather than attempting to
convert spectrum licenses into a species of property. This is not, as some
have argued, at the expense of exclusively licensed services, since the FCC
must still ensure that these unlicensed services do not interfere with exist-
ing licensed services. First Amendment principles, combined with the pub-
lic policy mandated by Congress in the Communications Act, dictate that
the FCC should facilitate unlicensed access while regarding requests to
enhance exclusive rights with considerable skepticism.
The FCC cannot justify, on the grounds of economic benefits such as
high spectrum auction revenues, regulations that limit the First Amend-
ment speech rights of would-be speakers. Indeed, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly prohibited this course of action in the context of exclusive cable
franchises.1 6 There is no legal basis for the suggestion that the First
Amendment calculus applied to cable should yield a different result in the
context of wireless. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has indicated that,
were technology to advance to a point where the "scarcity" rationale no
longer applied, it would view regulation of spectrum differently. 17 Thus,
where technology provides a means to eliminate the risk of interference,
the First Amendment requires the FCC to create rules supporting that tech-
nology.'
8
This article does not claim technology has advanced to the point of in-
validating the scarcity rationale altogether; in fact, interference-avoidance
technology remains at an early stage. Indeed, as others have argued, the
idea that exclusive use and non-exclusive use cannot coexist is a false di-
chotomy.' 9 This article also does not contend that considerations of eco-
nomics or other non-interference concerns have no place in FCC evalua-
tions of service rules and spectrum allocation. The general public interest
standard and specific provisions of the Communications Act require the
16 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986).
17 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.l 1 (1984). In League
of Women Voters, the Supreme Court observed that critics contend the scarcity rationale is
obsolete. Id. Despite recognizing the critics' position, the Court was "not prepared.. .to
reconsider [the] longstanding approach [of approving broadcast regulation based upon the
scarcity rationale] without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological devel-
opments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may
be required." Id.
18 Cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) ("Where there are sub-
stantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is
idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish.").
19 See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, From Commons to Supercommons, 82 TEX L. REV. 863
(2004).
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FCC to consider numerous factors when setting service rules.2" This article
argues that putting unlicensed spectrum use on par with that of licensed use
will foster the development of interference avoidance technologies. It also
argues that those technologies will significantly decrease the need for spec-
trum regulation and enhance the ability of citizens to freely communicate
with one another as envisioned by the First Amendment. Finally, the First
Amendment and public interest factors mandated by the Communications
Act 2 ' require an evolutionary approach to spectrum management. By fos-
tering shared, non-exclusive access, the FCC can move unlicensed spec-
trum use from its position as "third class citizen" to its rightful place as
"first among equals."
The FCC should therefore adopt a more rigorous standard of review, in-
cluding the imposition of a high standard of proof upon those opposing
proposals for new unlicensed uses, and case-by-case remedies for instances
of alleged violations by authorized interference-avoidance devices. Spe-
cifically, the Commission should examine each new proposal under the
intermediate scrutiny standard of review. 22 Under this regime, the Commis-
sion would have to demonstrate a compelling government interest in order
to justify the denial of a proposal for greater non-exclusive use. When li-
censees or those favoring licensing argue that the proliferation of unli-
censed devices would cause destructive interference, the FCC should re-
quire those opponents to show substantial evidence justifying those claims.
Where evidence about possible interference remains inconclusive, the FCC
should favor post hoc technological remedies that would allow for deacti-
vation or recall of devices rather than prohibiting their use entirely. Thus,
while a more rigorous review process would seem antithetical to the pro-
motion of unlicensed spectrum uses, it would in fact create a more level
playing field, thereby encouraging the development of more unlicensed
devices and uses.
Any other approach creates a First Amendment "Catch-22." The FCC
only exists because Congress concluded, and the Supreme Court con-
cuffed, that a government agency must regulate the use of spectrum to en-
sure that harmful interference does not render productive use of the public
airwaves impossible.23 Without this precondition, exclusive licensing of the
20 See 47 U.S.C. § 302a (2000).
21 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000).
22 The "intermediate scrutiny" standard is used by courts reviewing content-neutral
regulations affecting free speech. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994). Under that level of scrutiny, content-neutral regulations affecting free speech will
be sustained if they further an important or substantial government interest unrelated to
suppressing free expression, and are essential to advancing that government interest. See id.
at 636.
23 "Unless Congress had exercised its power over interstate commerce to bring about
allocation of available frequencies and to regulate the employment of transmission equip-
ment the result would have been an impairment of the effective use of these facilities by
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right to speak could not survive First Amendment scrutiny.24 In other
words, if technology existed that permitted everyone to use spectrum pro-
ductively with no harmful interference, the FCC would have no reason,
and thus no legal basis, for issuance of exclusive licenses. Only the FCC
can authorize new technology that minimizes the problem of interference,
yet the problem of interference justifies its existence. The Commission is
left in the conflicted position of having to authorize devices that could
eliminate the justification for its existence.25
If the FCC has the power to deny applications for reasons other than the
likelihood that the proposed use will harmfully interfere with existing li-
censed services, its denial of First Amendment rights comes to rest on cir-
cular reasoning. The FCC must regulate spectrum access to prevent harm-
ful interference. Why does harmful interference persist? Because the FCC
will not permit the development of technologies that avoid harmful inter-
ference. Why? Permitting development of such technologies would have
negative financial consequences for exclusive licensees, who only exist
because the FCC does not permit the development of technology that
would eliminate the problem of interference.
The "first among equals" (FAE) approach differs from the property and
commons approaches that have dominated the debate over spectrum re-
form in recent years.26 Rather than proposing one approach over the other,
or suggesting side by side existence in allocated bands, an evolutionary
approach is needed-an approach the FCC can implement without Con-
gressional action or radical redistribution of access rights. The FAE ap-
proach would balance the interests of high power exclusive users and
lower-powered non-exclusive users, with the goal of promoting the most
productive use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and, most importantly, the
greatest freedom of speech.
First Amendment analysis prohibits the complete propertization of spec-
trum proposed by some advocates. Moreover, where proponents offer only
economic justifications, the First Amendment prevents treating white
spaces and underlays as exclusive property rights. As demonstrated below,
however, empirical evidence casts doubt on property proponents' claims
that a massive and sudden transition to treating spectrum licenses as a spe-
cies of property would generate economic or social benefits. Because the
anyone." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940). See also Krystilyn
Corbett, The Rise of Private Property Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46 DuKE L.J. 611,
617-20 (1996-97). The Federal Communications Commission, created by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, was mandated to resolve conflicting spectrum uses by devising an exclu-
sive spectrum license regime. Id. at 617-18.
24 Charles Jackson, et al., Spread Spectrum Is Good, But It Does Not Obsolete NBC v.
U.S.!, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 245, 246-48 (2006) (arguing that technological advances have not
yet eliminated the basis for regulating spectrum based upon scarcity).
25 Faulhaber, supra note 15, at 141.
26 Id. at 142-52.
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FAE approach of balancing non-exclusive and exclusive uses rejects the
false dichotomy advanced by property proponents (and some commons
proponents as well), adoption of the FAE framework serves the public in-
terest even if it were not mandated as a First Amendment issue.
The FCC has already taken the first steps in encouraging an FAE ap-
proach. The FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, a comprehensive
but non-binding study and evaluation of FCC spectrum policy, recom-
mended that the FCC work to enhance the flexibility of both exclusive
rights and unlicensed access." On several occasions, the FCC has explored
options for introducing new opportunities for unlicensed underlays com-
patible with exclusive licensed services.28 The FCC has also initiated a
proceeding to establish interference temperature metrics that would facili-
tate unlicensed use in exclusive bands where such use would not interfere
with the existing licensed use.29 If the FCC adopted this metric, it would
serve as an important first step in facilitating the restructuring of the exist-
ing spectrum hierarchy.
In Part II, this article examines the traditional basis for the Commission's
authority to issue exclusive licenses and non-exclusive Part 15 certifica-
tions. The section argues that "unlicensed spectrum" is a misnomer; the
FCC's Part 15 certification is simply another species of license. As a con-
27 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT 3 (2002), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A 1.pdf.
28 See In re Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 and 101 of the Commission's Rules to
Facilitate the Provision of Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access, Educational and Other
Advanced Services in the 2150-2162 and 2500-2690 MHz Bands; Part 1 of the Commis-
sion's Rules - Further Competitive Bidding Procedures; Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 to
Enable Multipoint Distribution Service and the Instructional Television Fixed Service
Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 to Engage in Fixed Two-Way Transmissions; Amendment
of Parts 21 and 74 of the Commission's Rules With Regard to Licensing in the Multipoint
Distribution Service and in the Instructional Television Fixed Service for the Gulf of Mex-
ico, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R.
6722, 1 145-48 (Mar. 12, 2003) (soliciting comment on possible underlay); In re Amend-
ment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 and 101 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate the Provision of
Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access, Educational and Other Advanced Services in the
2150-2162 and 2500-2690 MHz Bands; Part 1 of the Commission's Rules - Further Com-
petitive Bidding Procedures; Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 to Enable Multipoint Distribu-
tion Service and the Instructional Television Fixed Service Amendment of Parts 21 and 74
to Engage in Fixed Two-Way Transmissions; Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Com-
mission's Rules With Regard to Licensing in the Multipoint Distribution Service and in the
Instructional Television Fixed Service for the Gulf of Mexico; Promoting Efficient Use of
Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 14,165 In
138-39 (Jun. 12, 2004) (rejecting underlay for lack of engineering data but leaving open
possible future underlay).
29 In re Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and Manage
Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile and
Satellite Frequency Bands, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
F.C.C.R. 25,309, 1 (Nov. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Interference Temperature NOI].
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sequence, there is nothing in the Communications Act that prohibits the
FCC from reexamining its traditional hierarchy and moving to an FAE
approach that creates a modest preference for rules that maximize the abil-
ity of people to use spectrum on a non-exclusive basis.
In Part Ill, this article explains why the First Amendment requires an
FAE approach and prohibits a pure property-rights regime. That section
examines proposals for treating schemes for non-exclusive use-such as
interference temperature metrics and use of broadcast white spaces-as a
form of exclusive property. Part III additionally examines briefly the pub-
lic policies favoring an FAE framework over a pure property regime, even
absent First Amendment considerations. Finally, in Part IV, this article
explores how application of the FAE approach might operate by applying
it to pending Commission proceedings.
II. THE FCC'S AUTHORITY TO CREATE "UNLICENSED" ACCESS
A. History of Spectrum Licensing
Initially, radio transmission required no licensing. As use of radio trans-
mission became increasingly popular for commercial broadcasts and non-
commercial uses, in 1927 Congress determined that interference between
users required limiting the number of people transmitting frequencies.3 ° To
address this problem, Congress enacted the Radio Act, creating the Federal
Radio Commission.3' The Communications Act of 1934 renamed this body
the "Federal Communications Commission" and added to its jurisdiction
wireline communication and general authority over "all means of commu-
nication" included in § 1 of the Act.32
A significant portion of the Communications Act of 1934, like its prede-
cessor, addressed spectrum licensing. When amended in 1934, the portions
of the Radio Act addressing licensing of spectrum use became Title In of
the Communications Act, but otherwise remained unchanged.33 Through-
out Title III, Congress demonstrated a clear intent to tightly control the use
of spectrum. 34 Section 301 explains Congress' intent in Title III to maintain
control of radio in the United States and to "provide for the use of such
30 See In re Nextwave Personal Commc'ns, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1999)
(recounting the history of licenses and the governmental regulation of radio spectrum).
31 Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed and
amended by the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416,48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
32 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 151, 48 Stat. 1064.
33 Compare Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, §§ 9-15, 44 Stat. 1162
(1927) with Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, §§ 301-329, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934).
34 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
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channels, but not the ownership thereof[,]" under FCC licenses.3" Section
304 requires all licensees to waive "any claim to the use of any particular
frequency or of the electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory
power of the United States. 36 In the event anyone missed the limitations
Congress imposed on licensees, Section 309(h) makes abundantly clear
that licensees have no expectation of right beyond the four comers of a
license.37 A licensee enjoys neither an expectation of renewal nor a right to
transfer or sell its license unless it demonstrates that renewal or transfer
will serve the public interest.
38
A licensee enjoys very limited rights against the regulatory power of the
FCC. For example, the FCC may, after giving due notice and process, alter
the terms of a license over objection of a licensee. 39 The FCC may revoke a
license if a licensee fails to comply with the rules or maliciously interferes
with a signal licensed or otherwise authorized by the FCC.4° The Commu-
nications Act also imposes a general obligation to use the minimum power
necessary to achieve a desired purpose, even where the license might au-
thorize greater power.4'
In the nearly 80 years since the passage of the Federal Radio Act, Con-
gress has never wavered from its intent to strictly control licenses. When
Congress authorized distribution of licenses by auction,42 it emphatically
rejected any interpretation that auctions conferred any kind of property
right, or that distribution by auction conferred any right or privilege differ-
ent from other means of distribution.43 As the Second Circuit explained in
In re Nextwave Communications:
The FCC's auction rules promulgated under §309(j) have primarily a regulatory pur-
pose: to ensure that spectrum licenses end up in the hands of those most likely to fur-
ther congressionally defined objectives. The fact that market forces are the technique
used to achieve that regulatory purpose does not turn the FCC into a mere creditor, any
more than it turns an FCC license won at auction into a property estate in spectrum.








42 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4008 (man-
dating that the Commission use, for a limited period of time, competitive bidding to grant
licenses for mutually exclusive applications). Congress extended the "trial" use of competi-
tive bidding, granting ongoing authority to the Commission for the use of auctions in as-
signing licenses. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 111 Stat. 251, 258-
67.
43 47 U.S.C. § 309()(6)(D) (2000) ("Nothing in this subsection, or in the use of com-
petitive bidding, shall ... be construed to convey any rights, including any expectation of




than licenses, and the sole responsibility for the allocation of licenses lies with the
FCC, with appeal to the courts of appeals, not the bankruptcy or district courts.
4"
Indeed, where the FCC has sought to further privatize spectrum rights,
Congress has acted to prevent that approach. In 2002, the FCC attempted
to use an administrative proceeding to permit licensees to auction their
Ultra High Frequency ("UHF") licenses as a means of speeding the transi-
tion to digital television.45 Congress acted swiftly to prevent the proposed
auction, reiterating its intent to prevent private parties from selling access
to the public airwaves. 4 6 As a result, the FCC has become far more circum-
spect in its efforts to experiment with private ownership of spectrum li-
censes.
4 7
While congressional control over license distribution has understandably
earned the scorn of proponents of the "property" regime,48 it also raises a
troubling question for proponents of unlicensed spectrum use. Given the
clear congressional intent to maintain control over spectrum use, where
does the FCC derive its power to authorize Part 15 "unlicensed" spectrum?
The lack of clear authority has prompted licensee stakeholders to assert
that, to the extent the FCC can authorize unlicensed access under its Part
15 rules, it must limit the rights of Part 15 users and subordinate those
rights to licensed users.49
In fact, the FCC has maintained precisely such a hierarchy, assuring li-
censees superior rights to users of unlicensed spectrum. But recent recom-
mendations by the FCC's Spectrum Task Force, as well as proposals sup-
ported by technology companies and advocates of the "commons" school
of spectrum reform, have prompted the FCC to consider new alternatives.
44 In re Nextwave Personal Commc'ns, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1999).
45 In re Reallocation of and Service Rules for the 698-46 MHz Spectrum Band, Report
and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 1022, T 6 (Dec. 12, 2001).
46 Auction Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-195, 116 Stat. 715 (2002).
47 For example, the FCC declined to adopt a proposed two-way auction as a means of
rebanding the 2.5-2.69 GHz band in 2004. See In re Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 and
101 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate the Provision of Fixed and Mobile Broadband
Access, Educational and Other Advanced Services in the 2150-2162 and 2500-2690 MHz
Bands, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 14,165
(2004).
48 See, e.g., James B. Speta, Making Spectrum Reform "Thinkable," 4 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 183, 185 (2005).
49 See In re Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules to allow certification of
equipment in the 24.05-24.25 GHz band at field strengths up to 2500 mV/m, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 15,944, 14 (Jul. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Part 15 Certifica-
tion M&O] (rejecting American Radio Relay League argument that licensed services enjoy
statutory priority to unlicensed devices); In re Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices
Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, Comments of Cingular Wireless LLC, ET Docket
No. 02-380, at 2-4 (April 17, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing Sys-
tem) [hereinafter Cingular Comments] (arguing that § 301 prohibits authorized unlicensed
services).
[Vol. 15
Unlicensed Spectrum: First Among Equals
Notably, proposals such as ultra-wide band ("U WB") 0 and interference
temperature5 have called into question the validity of the FCC's hierarchy
and required reexamination of the source of authority for the FCC's "unli-
censed" spectrum access rules.
B. Development of the "Unlicensed" Regime
The FCC first began authorizing "unlicensed" devices as early as 1938.
At the time, the FCC held that certain extremely low power uses of radio,
by their very nature, could not constitute interstate use. Therefore, those
devices were deemed to fall outside the Section 301 requirement that all
users of spectrum operate pursuant to a license.52
In 1982, however, Congress modified the Communications Act to give
the FCC explicit control of interstate and intrastate radio use.53 According
to the legislative history, Congress sought to relieve the FCC of the expen-
sive and tedious need to demonstrate that specific radio communications
constituted interstate rather than intrastate transmissions.54 Numerous users
of the then-popular citizen's band ("CB") radio service created interference
problems by illegally increasing the power of their transmitters. To prose-
cute these offenders, courts required the FCC to produce expert testimony
demonstrating that the "supercharged" CB radio constituted an interstate,
rather than merely an intrastate, use of radio and thus violated the prohibi-
tion in Section 301 of operating without an FCC license.55
Section 301 was significantly broadened by the 1982 amendments,
which unambiguously required an FCC license for any use of radio spec-
trum.56 At the same time, however, Congress sought to relieve the FCC of
the expense of processing millions of pro forma licenses to operate CB
radios.57 Congress therefore created Section 307(e), which allows the FCC
5o See In re Revision of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband
Transmission Systems, First Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435, 1 (2002).
51 See Interference Temperature NOI, supra note 29, 1.
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). See also Kenneth R. Carter, et al., Unlicensed and Un-
shackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory
Issues iv, 6 (OSP Working Paper No. 39, 2003).
13 Pub. L. 97-259, § 107 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 301(2006)).
54 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-765 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 CONFERENCE REPORT].
55 Id. at 31-32.
56 Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 107, 96 Stat.
1087, 1091 (1982).
57 At the time, to comply with Section 301, the FCC required CB manufacturers to
include a pro forma application for a license to operate the CB, with instructions that the
CB operator fill out the application and mail it to the FCC. Although the FCC estimated that
only a small fraction of CB radio operators complied, even this relatively low return rate
taxed the FCC's staff. See 1982 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 54.
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to license four specific radio services "by rule . . . without [the need for]
individual licenses. 58
Given this broad new power, and narrow exception, to Section 301, what
was to become of the FCC's ongoing efforts to permit "unlicensed" use of
spectrum? As opponents to expanding Part 15 have argued, Congress si-
multaneously expanded the license requirement to include intrastate trans-
missions and created a very narrow exception for services "licensed by
rule." How could the FCC continue to authorize "unlicensed users" outside
the narrow exception of Section 307(e)?
Apparently, unaware of the possibility that Congress had unintentionally
eliminated its authority to authorize use of low power wireless without a
license, the FCC undertook a major modification of its Part 15 rules in
1987.59 The FCC reviewed its past history of authorizing individual appli-
cations for operation without licenses under Part 15, concluding that its
piecemeal approach imposed needless expenses on those seeking to pro-
vide service, and deprived consumers of the benefits of new wireless de-
vices.6° Accordingly, the FCC proposed to move from a case-by-case ap-
proach to a systematic approach that would maximize innovation while
protecting licensed services from harmful interference."
Specifically, the 1987 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("1987 NPRM")
proposed to designate underlay bands by setting maximum power output
for each band.62 Any device manufacturer who could prove that the device
met specific technical specifications for operation in a band-such as
power limitations and protection of neighboring bands from interference-
would receive a certification permitting manufacture of the device.63 Criti-
cally, the manufacturer would not need to explain the purpose of the de-
vice, or even limit the device to a single purpose. Rather, the consumer
device owner would decide, presumably but not necessarily based on the
intended purpose of the manufacturer, how to use the device.
64
In exchange for this flexibility, users of Part 15 devices would become
subject to certain limitations. 65 The proposed rules would require a Part 15
device to accept interference from any source and interfere with any li-
censed service. The Part 15 device must cease operation immediately, if
necessary, to avert interference to the licensed service.66
58 47 U.S.C. § 307(e) (2000).
59 In re Revision of Part 15 of the rules regarding operation of radio frequency devices
without an individual license, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 F.C.C.R. 6135, 9M 1, 4
(Set. 17, 1987).
Id.
61 Id. N 12-18.
62 Id. 9M 36-39, 41-49.
63 Id. 136.
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The Commission adopted the proposed changes with only minor modifi-
cation in 1989.67 The Commission did not explain, however, in either the
1987 NPRM or the 1989 decision, the source of its authority for those
rules. There also appeared to be no consideration of whether the 1982
amendments to the Communications Act, by eliminating the distinction
between unregulated intrastate transmissions and regulated interstate
transmission and requiring a license for all wireless transmissions, altered
the Commission's authority with respect to unlicensed spectrum. The FCC
invoked its general authority under sections 154, 302, 303, and 307 of the
Communications Act,68 but these sections offer little insight into the FCC's
thought process with respect to its authority to promulgate rules for unli-
censed spectrum use outside those specifically authorized by Congress.
Section 154 refers to general Commission authority; section 302 addresses
certification of electronic equipment to minimize potential interference;
section 303 provides general authority to regulate licenses; section 304
requires all licensees to waive any claim against the regulatory power of
the United States as a consequence of prior use; and section 307 provides
certain considerations with regard to allocation of licenses and renewals, as
well as Section 307(e) added in 1982.69
The preface to the Part 15 rules adopted in 1989 implies that the FCC
considered its Part 15 certification authority to arise out of Section 302.70
The FCC has, in fact, relied upon such an approach from time to time.7,
This approach, however, has numerous difficulties. Congress created Sec-
67 In re Revision of Part 15 of the rules regarding operation of radio frequency devices
without an individual license, Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 3493, (H 1-13 (Mar. 30, 1989)
[hereinafter 1989 R&O]
68 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 154, 302a, 303, 304, 307 (2000). See also In re Revision of Part 15
of the rules regarding operation of radio frequency devices without an individual license,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 F.C.C.R. 6135, app. B at 8 (Sept. 17, 1987); 1989
R&O, supra note 67, at app. B 1.
69 See §§ 154, 302a, 303, 304, 307, 307(e).
70 The preface to Part 15 reads as follows:
(a) This Part sets out the regulations under which an intentional, unintentional, or inci-
dental radiator may be operated without an individual license. It also contains the
technical specifications, administrative requirements and other conditions relating to
the marketing of Part 15 devices.
(b) The operation of an intentional or unintentional radiator that is not in accordance
with the regulations in this Part must be licensed pursuant to the provisions of Section
301 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, unless otherwise exempted from
the licensing requirements elsewhere in this Chapter.
(c) Unless specifically exempted, the operation or marketing of an intentional or unin-
tentional radiator that is not in compliance with the administrative and technical provi-
sions in this Part, including prior Commission authorization or verification, as appro-
priate, is prohibited under Section 302 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, and Subpart I of Part 2 of this Chapter. The equipment authorization and
verification procedures are detailed in Subpart J of Part 2 of this Chapter.
47 C.F.R. §§ 15.1(a)-(c) (2005); 1989 R&O, supra note 67.
71 See Part 15 Certification M&O, supra note 49, 1 11-15.
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tion 302a in 1968,72 and modified it as part of the 1982 amendments.73 The
legislative history of the 1982 amendments demonstrates that Congress
saw a need to control growing radio frequency interference from home
consumer devices, 7 and the need to address equipment manufacturers'
arguments that the FCC lacked the proper authority to regulate incidental
radiators of electromagnetic energy.75
The plain language of the statute itself, while not explicitly prohibiting
such an interpretation, lends little support to the idea that Section 302 may
serve as a separate source of authority for behavior prohibited by Section
301, as 47 CFR § 15.1(b) implies. The statute authorizes the FCC
to make reasonable regulations (1) governing the interference potential of devices
which in their operation are capable of emitting radio frequency energy . . in suffi-
cient degree to cause harmful interference to radio communications; and (2) establish-
ing minimum performance standards for home electronic equipment and systems to
reduce their susceptibility to interference from radio frequency energy.76
While the Part 15 rules describe performance standards, they also author-
ize "an apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or
signals by radio, 7 7 which, under Section 301, may only take place subject
to a license granted by the FCC and subject to the other limitations of "li-
censes" in the Act.
The apparent conflict between sections 301 and 302 likely seemed of lit-
tle consequence in 1989, since no one anticipated using Part 15 devices for
communication. The uses of Part 15 devices prior to 1989 seemed more
supportive of a reliance upon section 302. Prior to 1989, Part 15 devices
were primarily used for very short range communication between con-
sumer devices-typically electronic garage door openers, television remote
controls, and cordless telephones.78 While those devices transmitted signals
by radio, they did not seem to be of the type of communication Congress
intended to cover under Section 301. In fact, the FCC historically author-
ized use of such devices without any explicit authority, based on a theory
that Section 301 simply did not cover such low power, non-interfering de-
vices. No one raised the question as to whether Congress' 1982 modifica-
tions of Section 301 altered the traditional FCC analysis; it is unsurprising
that the FCC did not question its own authority.
As time passed, however, the ability to use low power Part 15 devices for
communication became increasingly clear. In 1996, the FCC proposed
extending the Part 15 rules to permit low power transmissions in the 5.8
GHz band as part of the creation of a new, unlicensed national information
72 Pub. L. 90-379, 82 Stat. 290 (1968).
73 Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259 § 108, 96 Stat. 1087.
74 See 1982 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 21-23.
71 Id. at 32-33.
76 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a) (2000).
77 § 301.
78 See Carter et al., supra note 52 at 6-7.
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infrastructure. 79 Again, although individual parties objected to specifics of
the proposal, the FCC's general authority to authorize that use went un-
questioned and the Commission adopted the proposal in 1997.80 Unlike that
of 1989, the 1997 action had the unambiguous intent of authorizing data
communication along with the potential for voice and video communica-
tions identical to those authorized under traditional Section 301 licenses.8'
Again, however, the authority of the FCC to authorize a new unlicensed
service went unchallenged, and the FCC did not question its own authority
to act.
C. Expansion of Part 15 Authority
Only recently, as users of unlicensed spectrum have sought further ex-
pansion of Part 15 authority that extends into bands populated with li-
censed users, have licensees begun to actively challenge the Commission's
authority to authorize Part 15 services.8 ' By this time, however, the FCC's
Part 15 rules had received a Congressional imprimatur, if not explicit au-
thority.83
As part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress required the FCC
to use auctions to resolve most cases of conflicting applications for li-
censes, and ordered that the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration ("NTIA") and the FCC cooperate to clear government op-
erations from particular frequency bands to create new opportunities to
auction licenses. 84 That same act, however, prohibited the FCC from clear-
ing and auctioning licenses in bands "allocated or authorized for unli-
censed use pursuant to Part 15 of the Commission's regulations" at the
time of passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and where "the op-
eration of services licensed pursuant to competitive bidding would inter-
fere with the operation of end-user products permitted under such regula-
79 In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Provide for Operation of Unlicensed
NIl/Super Net Operations in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
11 F.C.C.R. 7205, N 1-2 (Apr. 25, 1996).
s0 In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Provide for Operation of Unlicensed
NI/Super Net Operations in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
1576, 1 17-18 (Jan. 9, 1997) (authorizing the new band for Part 15 devices).
81 Id. 8-18.
82 See Cingular Comments, supra note 49, at 2-4 (challenging Commission's authority
to authorize ultra-wide band operations across frequency bands assigned to licensees); Part
15 Certification M&O, supra note 49, 12-15 (rejecting argument of American Radio
Relay League that any transmitter capable of sending signals must be licensed under Sec-
tion 301). See generally R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getting Better Reception
from the FCC's Spectrum Policy, 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 5 (2003),
httr:/stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/03_STLR_5.
3 See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 3001-08, 111 Stat.
257.
'4 Id. § 3002.
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tion."85 In other words, as of 1997, Congress: (a) demonstrably knew the
FCC authorized unlicensed devices, (b) approved of this exercise of Com-
mission authority, and (c) demonstrated a preference for keeping unli-
censed devices free from interference from newly authorized licensed ser-
vices.86
Although this Congressional approval mooted the argument that the FCC
lacked authority to authorize unlicensed devices, the exact nature and
scope of the FCC's authority remained unclear. In 2001, the FCC clarified
that it derived its authority to permit operation of Part 15 devices from
Section 302, and reaffirmed this position in 2003 in response to a Petition
for Reconsideration.87 In the Part 15 Certification Memorandum Opinion
and Order, the FCC maintained that its authority to regulate devices capa-
ble of causing harmful interference permitted it to authorize devices that do
not interfere with licensed services.88 Since the rules adopted ensured that
the devices authorized under Part 15 would not cause harmful interference
with any licensed service, and required Part 15 devices that caused inter-
ference to cease operation, no conflict existed between the authorization of
unlicensed devices pursuant to Section 302 and licensed services pursuant
to Section 301.89
While not prohibited on its face, this assertion draws little support either
from the plain language or the statutory history of Section 302. On the
other hand, the section provides a source for FCC authority subsequently
ratified by Congress in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and consistent
with the language of the 1989 Report and Order and Part 15.1 of the
Commission Rules.9'
Confronted with this apparent conflict, the FCC undertook a thorough
examination of its Part 15 authority and its relationship to services licensed
pursuant to Section 301 in its 2004 Second Report and Order and Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order on UWB service ("Second UWB Or-
der").9' UWB systems "generally employ pulse modulation where ex-
tremely narrow (short) bursts of [radio frequency] energy are modulated
and emitted to convey information. 9 2 Because these systems use short
bursts covering wide bandwidths, UWB systems emit across a wide num-
85 id.
86 Cf. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 3001-08, 111 Stat. 257.
87 In re Amendment of Part 15 to allow certification of equipment in the 24.05-24.25
GHz Band at field strengths up to 2500 mV/m, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,337, 1 12
(Dec. 11, 2001), af'd, Part 15 Certification M&O, supra note 49, 1 14.
88 See Part 15 Certification M&O, supra note 49, U 3-7.
89 See id. 11.
90 See 1989 R&O, supra note 67; 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2005).
91 In re Revision of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband
Transmission Systems, Second Report and Order and Second Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 24,558 (Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Second UWB R&O].
92 Id. 72.
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ber of bands simultaneously, including bands usually prohibited to Part 15
operation.93 Unsurprisingly, licensees vigorously protested and argued the
statutory authority question, requiring a thorough response from the FCC.94
The FCC began its analysis not with Section 302, but with Section 301.95
It concluded that, while Section 301 speaks of "any apparatus" for trans-
mission of energy, "the statute is not phrased in terms of 'any' energy, 'any
degree' of energy, or 'any level' of energy. 96 In light of subsequent acts of
Congress since the passage of Section 301 indicating Congressional ap-
proval of the FCC's Part 15 regime, the FCC concluded that "a more rea-
sonable reading of Section 301, consistent with Congress' intent and sub-
sequent legislation, would limit the licensing requirement to any apparatus
that transmits enough energy to have a significant potential for causing
harmful interference.,
97
In other words, the FCC reached the same result as it had under its Sec-
tion 302 analysis through an administrative interpretation of Section 301.
In this reading, Congress' enactment and subsequent modification of Sec-
tion 302 served to bolster and support the FCC's interpretation of Section
301, rather than operate as a separate source of authority. Nevertheless, it
reached the same end result. As long as the FCC imposed sufficient limits
on a device to prevent it from having significant potential of interfering
with services licensed under Section 301, the device itself did not require
an individual license.
The FCC went even further in its analysis. By identifying the gray area
between devices operating at sufficiently low power as not to require a
license and those requiring a license, the FCC offered an alternative justifi-
cation for its Part 15 rules:
[O]ur Part 15 requirements provide a sufficient degree of regulatory oversight, indi-
vidualized review and approval to constitute a "licensing" process that satisfies Section
301 requirements. While we do not apply the term "license" to the Part 15 approvals
that are required to manufacture and distribute Part 15 devices, such approvals (e.g.,
certifications for intentional radiators) constitute agency authorization for the manufac-
ture, distribution and use of devices that have passed individualized requirements. As
such, there is little to distinguish in a practical or legal sense Part 15 approvals of de-
vices from the more overt Section 301 "licenses."
Section 301 does not limit the types of licenses that the Commission may grant, and
the Commission has exercised discretion in developing a diverse regulatory scheme.
Section 3 of the Act defines "station license," "radio station license," or "license"
broadly to mean "that instrument of authorization required by this Act or the rules and
93 Id. 2-5.
94 In point of fact, the FCC also rejected the legal arguments for procedural reasons,
arguably rendering its reasoning on its statutory authority dicta. The language of the FCC's
order, however, makes clear that the agency adopted this interpretation of its authority as
binding. Id. 160.
9' Id. H 64-78.
96 Id. 68.
9' Id. 1 68.
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regulations of the Commission made pursuant to this Act, for the use or operation of
apparatus for the transmission of energy, or communications, or signals by radio by
whatever name the instrument may be designated by the Commission.
9 8
In other words, Section 301 does not conflict with Part 15 because Part
15 is itself a form of FCC "license" permissible under Section 301. In sup-
port of this argument, the FCC compared its Part 15 rules with other licens-
ing schemes, such as the blanket authorizations for cell phones operating in
conjunction with a site-licensed cellular tower, and found that the Part 15
procedures for "unlicensed devices" varied little from those imposed on
certain licensed devices. 99
Past FCC practice buttresses this interpretation of Section 301 authority.
In at least one case, the Commission assigned a Section 301 license to an
equipment manufacturer, with blanket permission pursuant to the license to
manufacture transceivers.'0° The Commission explicitly found that it acted
pursuant to its Section 301 authority, and that such blanket authority was
consistent with actions taken in other proceedings. 1°t
Also instructive is the FCC's use of similar logic in the related area of li-
censing under Title II of the Communications Act.102 In the 1980s, prior to
the establishment of forbearance authority under Section 10, Section 214
of the Act required that all telecommunication service providers obtain a
certificate of public convenience and necessity before constructing or ex-
tending any line."°3 In several proceedings over time, the FCC determined
that issuing blanket authority for particular classes of carriers to extend or
construct lines satisfied the statutory requirement for individual licenses to
extend lines.' °4 As with Section 301 licensing, the FCC determined that the
statutory language requiring a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity could be satisfied by a blanket determination by the Commission. °5
98 Id., I 75-76. See also 47 U.S.C. § 153(42) (2000) (defining "license"). Likewise, the
Administrative Procedures Act defines license as "the whole or a part of an agency permit,
certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
permission." 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2000).
99 See Second UWB R&O, supra note 91, 76.
1oo See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum for, and to
Establish Other Rules and Policies Pertaining to, a Radiodetermination Satellite Service;
Policies and Procedures for the Licensing of Space and Earth Stations in the Radiodetermi-
nation Satellite Service, Second Report and Order, 104 F.C.C. 2d. 650, 28-29 (Apr. 22,
1986).
'o' Id. at 667 n.56.
102 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276. (2000).
103 Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982) with 47 U.S.C. § 214 (2000).
104 See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servi-
ces and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 29, 33
53 (Aug. 1, 1980) [hereinafter Competitive Common Carrier First R&O]; In re Policy and
Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authori-
zations Therefor, Fifth Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (Aug 8, 1984).
105 Competitive Common Carrier First R&O, supra note 104.
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Interpreting Part 15 device certification as a form of Section 301 licens-
ing complicates the literal interpretation of some provisions of the Com-
munications Act. Section 304, for example, requires individual waivers
from licensees acknowledging that a licensee has no rights beyond the
terms of the license and waiving any claim against the regulatory authority
of the United States.'0 6 Section 301 requires licenses to endure for a limited
duration rather than in perpetuity.'0 7 Section 310(d) prohibits transfers of
licenses absent a specific Commission finding that the transfer will serve
the public interest, convenience, and necessity.0 8
As the FCC discussed in the Second UWB Order,"9 its Part 15 regula-
tions comply with Section 301 in substance, if not in form, and further the
goals of that section "to provide for the use, but not ownership thereof' of
"all the channels of radio transmission."" ° The stipulations that every Part
15 device operator refrain from interfering with any licensed service, and
that operators accept any interference from any source served the same
purpose as the waiver required by Sections 304 and 309(h)."' Section
310(d) permission to market and sell devices as part of the Part 15 certifi-
cation process is akin to a blanket license to operate under Section 301.
Finally, the license term is limited by the life of the device itself. When the
device ceases to operate, the operator has no authority to continue opera-
tion unless he or she purchases a new device similarly approved under Part
15.112
While reasonable minds may differ on the current interpretation of these
provisions of the Act, requiring a more literal reading of these statutory
provisions would create havoc not merely for Part 15 devices, but for other
devices authorized for use in higher power licensed networks. For exam-
ple, every cell phone should, under a strict interpretation of the provisions
of Title III, require an individual license.' n 3 Individuals would need to ap-
ply for cell phones pursuant to Section 307 of the Act, 14 and any sale of a
cell phone would require Commission approval under Section 310(d).'
5
'06 47 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
107 § 301.
108 § 310(d).
109 Second UWB Order, supra note 91.
110 § 301.
"'. §§ 304 and 309(h); 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.5(b), 15.19 (2000).
112 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (prohibiting any person from "us[ing] or op-
erat[ing] any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by
radio" without a license) with 47 C.F.R. § 15.5 (2005) (indicating that an approved device
may transmit radio signals in the frequency designated for use of unlicensed devices).
113 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
"4 See id. (requiring a license to transmit radio frequencies); § 307(e) (listing those
instances in which a radio station may be operated without an individual license, and nota-
bly making no mention of an exception to the licensing requirement for cellular phones).
"5 See § 310(d) (requiring that no rights afforded under a station license be "transferred,
assigned, or disposed of in any manner" absent Commission approval.").
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Thus, if individual devices capable of transmitting signals can operate
within a traditionally licensed network do not require individual licenses
despite the plain language of Section 301 as applying to "any apparatus,",
1" 6
similar flexibility should apply to devices "licensed" by compliance with
Part 15.
A recent comment filed by the FCC in a proceeding conducted by the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") underscores this point." 7 In re-
sponse to an FAA proposal regarding, among other things, constructing or
altering communications antennae affecting the navigable airspace, the
FCC observed that the proposed new rule would impact "over 1 million"
individual antennas covered by "blanket licenses" to a few manufactur-
ers.1 8 As the FCC observed, a single license issued to a single manufac-
turer can cover up to 100,000 antennas that transmit and receive communi-
cations, and should-if one rigorously applied Section 301 as requiring an
individual license in all such cases-require individual licenses." 9
Even if Section 302 constitutes a wholly separate source of authority for
unlicensed authorizations, nothing in the Communications Act indicates
that Section 301 licensees must hold primary status over Section 302 certi-
fications. 2 ° To the contrary, the Communications Act consistently treats
licensed services and services otherwise authorized by the Commission as
deserving equal protection.'2 ' Moreover, the Act protects all services,
whether licensed under Section 301 or not, by imposing limits-such as
revocation of the licenses of operators shown to have purposefully inter-
fered with any other signal-on traditionally licensed services. 22 Whatever
the source of the Commission's authority for Part 15, therefore, it is in no
way subordinate to more traditional spectrum licenses.
116 § 301.
117 See In re Safe, Efficient Use and Preservation of Navigable Airspace, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, Docket No. FAA-2006-25002, Notice No. 06-06, Comments of the Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n (filed August 11, 2006), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf97/408773-web.pdf. The FAA notice proposed to re-
quire that owners of antenna meeting certain specified criteria file with the FAA prior to
constructing or modifying their antenna. Id. at 1.
118 Id. at 4-5.
19 Id.
120 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-302a (2000).
121 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(E) (2000) (permitting the Commission to suspend or
revoke license of operator that who "willfully or maliciously interfered with any other radio
communications or signals") (emphasis added); id. § 333 (prohibiting malicious interfe-
rence with any licensed or otherwise authorized operator) (emphasis added).
122 See §§ 303(m)(1)(E); id. § 309(j)(6)(C)-(D), (F); see also § 324 (imposing require-
ment to use "minimum necessary power" to send signals, even if higher power is authorized
by license); § 333 (prohibiting malicious interference by anyone including licensees, with
other authorized signals).
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III. RETHINKING THE SPECTRUM HIERARCHY
Rethinking Part 15 unlicensed access as simply another species of li-
censed communication under Section 301-or, in the alternative, as sepa-
rately authorized under Section 302--opens new possibilities in reconsid-
ering the balance between licensed and Part 15 services. Under the FCC's
traditional approach, as modified by the administrative interpretation in the
Second UWB Order, the FCC has concentrated on ensuring that Part 15
power levels remain "low enough" to fall bellow the mandatory licensing
requirement of Section 301.123 If nothing else, reconceiving Part 15 as a
species of licensed, rather than unlicensed, service allows the FCC to au-
thorize significantly higher power.
124
As a matter of law, nothing prevents the FCC from reconsidering its
longstanding policy of giving primacy to licensed services over Part 15
devices. To the contrary, where Congress has directly spoken, it has chosen
to protect Part 15 devices against interference from the intrusion of new
licensed services. 25 In addition, reconsidering the nature of Part 15 devices
provides the FCC with greater flexibility in balancing the interests of li-
censed users with those of unlicensed spectrum users. The FCC has author-
ity, for example, to prefer one licensed service over another, 26 to require
licensed services to coexist with one another,127 and even to migrate one
licensed service to another frequency band and award the new vacancy to
123 See Second UWB R&O, supra note 91, In 69-78.
124 Arguably, even under the FCC's traditional interpretation, any signal strength that
avoids interference with a licensed service is "low enough" to qualify for "unlicensed." The
language of the Second UWB R&O, however, clearly indicates that the FCC views the
defining characteristic of Part 15 as "low power," with the exception of the higher power
"grey area" now covered under a broader interpretation of Section 301. Id.
125 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002(c)(1)(C)(v) (prohibiting
creation of new licensed services in "bands allocated or authorized for unlicensed use pur-
suant to part 15" if such services "would interfere with operation of end-user products per-
mitted under such regulation").
126 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.809 (2005) (It is the responsibility of low power FM to avoid
interference with full power FM stations); In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Service,
Second Order On Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20
F.C.C.R. 6763, (N 37-39 (Mar. 16, 2005).
127 See, e.g., In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spec-
trum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New Ad-
vanced Wireless Services, Including Third Generation Wireless Systems; Amendments to
Parts 1, 2, 27, and 90 of the Commission's Rules to License Services in the 216-220 MHz,
1390-1395 MHz, 1427-1429 MHz, 1429-1432 MHz, 1432-1435 MHz, 1670-1675 MHz,
and 2385-2390 MHz Government Transfer Bands, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 4441, U 14-22 (Apr. 5, 2006); In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of
the Commission's Rules to Authorize Subsidiary Terrestrial Use of the 12.2-12.7 GHz
Band by Direct Broadcast Satellite Licensees and Their Affiliates; Applications of Broad-
wave USA, PDC Broadband Corporation, and Satellite Receivers, Ltd. to Provide a Fixed
Service in the 12.2-12.7 GHz Band, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 9614,
53 (Apr. 11, 2002).
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another service the FCC believes will better serve the public interest.'28 If
users of Part 15 devices stand as equals with users of traditionally licensed
services, the FCC is free to strike the balance that best serves the public
interest.
Indeed, the FCC has already taken several tentative steps in the direction
of creating greater equality between non-exclusive users and exclusive
licensees. For example, in 1995 the FCC authorized a new licensed service
in the 900 MHz band which would have to coexist with the unlicensed use
permitted in the band since 1989.29 To protect unlicensed users from po-
tential disruption, the FCC created a safe harbor rule for unlicensed de-
vices. 3 ° Devices complying with the safe harbor would be presumed to
operate in a manner compatible with the newly licensed service, and there-
fore not subject to the requirement to cease operation if the licensee com-
plained of harmful interference.'
3'
The FCC has also begun experimenting with "licensing-lite" regimes. In
doing so, the FCC has moved from a set of rules that gave privilege to ear-
lier users over later users-"first in time, first in right"-to rules actively
modeled on Part 15's more egalitarian approach. In 2005, for example, the
FCC authorized a non-exclusive licensed service in the 3650-3700 MHz
band.132 The band contained a limited number of satellite receiver sta-
tions. 133 As a result, large areas of the country could productively use the
band without interfering with the incumbents.
For years, the FCC considered whether to create a traditional exclusive
licensed service or to open the band to unlicensed use. 134 Ultimately, the
FCC chose neither. While the FCC emphasized that it acted pursuant to its
Section 301 licensing authority and did not intend to class the new service
as a Part 15 unlicensed service, the service rules provide for a distinctly
"commons" approach, incorporating interference-avoidance technology
employed by Part 15 devices. 135 The service rules permit any number of
128 See, e.g., Teledesic, LLC v. FCC, 275 F.3d 75, 83-87 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
129 See In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's rules to Adopt Regulations for
Automatic Vehicle Monitoring Systems, Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 4695, IN 29-39
(Feb. 3, 1995).
130 Id. 136.
131 Id. The FCC's recent proposal to enhance flexibility for this licensed service depends
on including additional safeguards to protect unlicensed users from increased interference.
In re Amendment of the Commission's Part 90 Rules in the 904-909.75 ad 919.75-928
NHz Bands, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 2809, [ 36-38 (Mar. 1, 2006).
132 In re Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band; Rules for Wireless Broad-
band Services in the 3650-3700 MHz Band; Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices
Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band; Amendment of the Commission's Rules With
Regard to the 3650-3700 MHz Government Transfer Band, Report and Order and Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 6502 (Mar. 10, 2005).
133 Id. ( 4-5
134 Id. U 5-11.
'5 Id. U 25-27.
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licensees within a geographic area and imposes upon all of them an obliga-
tion to coordinate with one another in good faith to avoid interference.'
3 6
Rather than rely on traditional frequency coordination committees, the
FCC ordered that any equipment to be certified include "contention based
protocols" to resolve conflicts among interfering transmitters. 37 Finally,
while maintaining significant exclusion zones around preexisting "pri-
mary" licensees, the FCC encouraged the primary licensees to negotiate
with the newly authorized licensees for non-interfering uses.
38
The Commission has taken some modest steps to alter its traditional
spectrum hierarchy. At the same time, however, it has also authorized sig-
nificant new licensed services over the last few years without any serious
consideration of permitting an unlicensed underlay, or of allocating use of
the band for unlicensed or other non-exclusive services.'39 The FCC has
also left several highly contested proposals to rethink spectrum access
waiting in limbo. These proposals include permitting non-interfering use
on a dynamic, real-time basis, 40 or allowing use of the "guard bands" and
"white spaces" of the television broadcast service.141
Property approach advocates complain that the FCC abandoned the allo-
cation of licenses on an exclusive basis in favor of non-exclusive alloca-
tions, 42 but that argument has little basis in reality. A proper understanding
of the First Amendment framework, as well as an examination of the pub-
lic interest framework imposed by the Communications Act, make clear
that the FCC should have the sort of pro-non-exclusive use bias that sup-
porters of the property school complain already exists. While this does not
require the abolition of exclusive licensing, as some in both the property
and commons camps have argued, the FCC has a long way to go before it
can properly realign the spectrum hierarchy from the traditional ladder to
an FAE regime encouraging non-exclusive use.
136 Id. E 24-30.
137 Id. 127.
138 Id. IN 25-30.
139 See, e.g., In re Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 GHz and 2.1
GHz Bands, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 25,162 (Oct. 16, 2003).
140 See Interference Temperature NOI, supra note 29, [ 2; see also In re Facilitating
Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spectrum Use Employing Cognitive
Radio Technologies, Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 5486, 3 (Mar. 10, 2005) (adopting
far more modest liberalization of rules governing software defined radios than initially
proposed).
141 In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands; Additional Spectrum for
Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 19 F.C.C.R. 10,018, 1, 10 (May 13, 2004).
142 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Advanced Wireless Technologies
and Public Policy, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 595, 595-64 (2006).
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A. The First Amendment Framework
As a general rule, discretionary licenses for the right to communicate are
repugnant to the First Amendment.'43 The Supreme Court has permitted the
federal government to restrict access to spectrum to a handful of govern-
ment-selected licensees only because unregulated use of the electromag-
netic spectrum by everyone would make the use of the spectrum by anyone
ineffective.1 In other words, because far more people wish to use the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum for various purposes than the medium can support,
the government must limit the number of licenses available to the public.
The need to manage the use of spectrum to avoid harmful interference
among all would-be users has become known as the "scarcity rationale."'
' 45
The scarcity rationale does not give the government unlimited authority
to curtail speech. To the contrary, because the government must suppress
rights of the vast majority of Americans to speak directly through the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, the scarcity rationale imposes on the government a
fundamental responsibility to protect the public's "collective right to have
the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment."' 46 The Supreme Court has found that the public interest
standard underlying the Communications Act "necessarily invites refer-
ence to First Amendment principles, and, in particular, to the First
Amendment goal of achieving 'the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources.'
147
It should be noted that few doctrines in the annals of First Amendment
jurisprudence have attracted so many critics and predictors of its imminent
demise. 148 The courts and Congress, however, have consistently rejected
attacks on the scarcity rationale. 49 As long as the government maintains
that interference creates a need to award exclusive rights to radio frequen-
cies it confers an obligation to protect the speech rights of those excluded
143 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 161-64 (2002) (holding that a requirement of registration to make a public speech
is incompatible with the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and assembly).
144 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943); Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson
Bros., 289 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1933).
145 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("Because of the scarcity
of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.").
146 id.
147 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (internal citations
omitted).
148 See, e.g., Jim Chen, Liberating Red Lion From the Glass Menagerie of Free Speech
Jurisprudence, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 293 (2002); Glen 0. Robinson, The Elec-
tronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DuKE L.J. 899 (1998); Christopher
S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment,
91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).
"49 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994).
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from use of these frequencies under the general requirement that issuance
of any license serve the public interest. 5° At the same time, however, strik-
ing the proper balance on how to protect these rights remains in the hands
of the FCC, subject to the direction of Congress.
15'
The precise dimensions of the limitations on Congress and the FCC's
ability to exclude non-interfering uses remain unexamined. 52 On the one
hand, determining how many licenses to grant for a particular service in a
particular geographic area is a quintessential "expert agency" question that
Congress intended to entrust to the FCC. On the other hand, the Constitu-
tion does not permit Congress (or its delegees) to override the First
Amendment rights of would-be speakers purely in the name of economic
efficiency. This suggests that the power to regulate under the scarcity ra-
tionale solely to exclude would-be speakers has limits.
Stuart Minor Benjamin argues that government restriction on the use of
radio frequencies should be subject to an "intermediate scrutiny" standard
of review. 53 Under this standard, Congress and the FCC must justify their
decisions to restrict the speech rights of individuals to use spectrum with a
compelling government purpose; suppression of speech must be incidental
to the government's goal and the regulation must burden no more speech
than necessary.'54
Application of this principle to the FCC's licensing regime argues for a
rather simple rule: where technology allows users to speak through the
electromagnetic spectrum without interference to the productive uses of
higher-powered licensed services, the FCC has no right preventing them
from speaking. Economic grounds alone are not a compelling government
interest, and thus cannot support exclusive licensing where the threat of
interference does not exist. Therefore, under the First Amendment analysis,
arguments that prohibiting speech by vesting property rights in licensees,
or that permitting use of unlicensed spectrum somehow constitutes unjust
enrichment to equipment manufacturers, must fail.'55
"0o Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90.
1'1 See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-603 (1981) (explaining that
the courts defer to the Commission regarding the best service of the public interest for con-
cers delegated to it by Congress).
152 See generally, Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum As First
Amendment Violation, 52 DuKE L. J. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Idle Spectrum]; see also Stuart
Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Public and Private Con-
trol, 78 N.Y.U. LAW. REv. 2007 (2003) [hereinafter Spectrum Abundance].
153 Benjamin, Idle Spectrum, supra note 152, at 6.
14 See id.
155 See, e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Equity, 4 . TELECOMM & HIGH TECH L. 217
(2005). As discussed in Part III, these arguments fail on their merits. Even if reasonable
minds may differ on the most beneficial economic policy, however, the failure of property
proponents to address the First Amendment issues dooms the property argument as simply
lying outside the feasible set.
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The Supreme Court has explicitly found that the First Amendment pro-
hibits the government from granting exclusive rights in communications
media unless the physical characteristics of the medium require exclusivity
as a precondition of productive use. In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Preferred Communications did not take part in an auc-
tion for an exclusive cable franchise. 156 Nevertheless, it applied for a fran-
chise in competition with the winner of the auction, and the City of Los
Angeles denied the application.'57 The district court upheld the power of
the city to award an exclusive license, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed on First Amendment grounds. 5 8 The Supreme Court re-
manded for further fact-finding on the question of whether physical limita-
tions required the city to limit the number of franchises.' 9 Finally, the
Court explicitly held that the desire of the city to maximize revenue or
maximize economic efficiency did not permit limiting the ability of citi-
zens to speak through the new medium any more than the city could limit,
in the name of economic efficiency, the number of newspapers circu-
lated.' 6° In other words, where the laws of physics no longer require exclu-
sivity, exclusivity cannot be justified on economic or efficiency grounds
alone.
It is not suggested that technology has advanced to the point where the
spectrum may accommodate all who wish to use it such that the days of
exclusive licensing have passed.'16 Indeed, many users, particularly those
in the public safety sector, will continue to demand exclusivity for the
foreseeable future. Those applications will still require that the FCC im-
pose necessary public interest obligations and service rules in order to en-
sure that these exclusive licenses serve the "public interest, convenience
and necessity" as required by Section 307 and Section 310(d) of the Com-
munications Act.
162
The ability of technology to provide unlicensed access to all citizens un-
der some conditions does not render the underlying basis of Federal Radio
Commission v. Nelson Brothers or NBC v. United States obsolete. 163 At the
156 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, 476 U.S. 488, 490 (1986).
117 Id. at490 and n.1.
15 Id. at 492.
159 Id.
'60 Id. at 494-95.
161 Cf FCC v. League of Women's Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.l 1 (1984) (ob-
serving that technological advances might someday render exclusive licensing obsolete).
162 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 310(d) (2000). Furthermore, even if scarcity were eliminated
as a matter of law, the Commission would still be required to impose public interest obliga-
tions on broadcasters and others, as licensed entities owe their superior position to govern-
ment exclusivity. See Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
163 Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266 (1933) (holding that national
regulation of broadcasting is not only appropriate but essential to the efficient use of radio);
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (finding that government control of spectrum
and the rules it implemented pursuant to that control were justified by the scarcity of the
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same time, however, the fact that some high power applications require
exclusive licensing does not eliminate the First Amendment rights of citi-
zens to use electromagnetic spectrum in a non-interfering way.
To analogize, the government may impose reasonable time and place re-
strictions on First Amendment activities on public property, but the gov-
ernment may not exclude more speakers than necessary. The Constitution
would not tolerate an auction for rights to protest in a town square on the
grounds that the auction would increase government revenue or to ensure
that only those who most value the right to speak publicly have the oppor-
tunity to do so. Such a scheme could not circumvent the First Amendment
by arguing that winners at auction would resell or rent to other speakers if
it were genuinely more efficient to allow just anyone to speak.' 64 To the
contrary, in the real world context, where genuine physical limitations and
well understood principles of private ownership are present, the Supreme
Court has found a state interest and authority to open private property to
public speech.
65
It makes no sense as a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence, there-
fore, to posit that the First Amendment rights of the vast majority of citi-
zens to speak directly to one another, rather than through a government-
licensed intermediary, can arbitrarily be circumscribed in the name of eco-
nomic efficiency. Even under the rational basis level of scrutiny applied by
courts reviewing decisions by Congress and the FCC, the Supreme Court
has found that "[t]he 'public interest' standard necessarily invites reference
to First Amendment principles. 166 Indeed, the FCC has a fundamental
responsibility to protect the public's "collective right to have the medium
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment."'167 Yet licensees invariably raise First Amendment free speech
claims and Fifth Amendment takings claims whenever the FCC considers
permitting new, non-exclusive uses to coexist with licensed uses. The FCC
and courts have had no difficulty rejecting these claims, but incumbents
raise them so often that a brief recitation of the grounds for rejecting the
claims seems warranted.
spectrum). Where unlicensed access reaches the point of scarcity, the scarcity rationale
prevails. See explanation of the scarcity rationale, supra note 145.
164 Cf. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n., 453 U.S. 114,
141-42 (1981) (White, J., concurring) (stating that a user fee is legitimate, even if it cuts off
access to public forum, provided the fee is used for recovery of costs).
165 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
166 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (internal citations
omitted).
167 See Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also Benjamin,
Idle Spectrum, supra note 152, at 110-11.
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B. Constitutional Objections to Non-Interfering Uses By Licensees
The vast majority of Red Lion critics do not object to the core argument
of the scarcity rationale that the government must limit the users of radio
frequency to a handful of licensees. Rather, critics object to the idea that
the government has authority to impose any rules or obligations beyond
those needed to protect the chosen few licensees from interfering with one
another. In particular, critics maintain that to the extent First Amendment
rights exist in spectrum use, they exist solely in the hands of licensees.
In the mass media context, these critics argue that requiring broadcasters
to provide access to their spectrum, 68 obliging broadcasters to act as trus-
tees in providing service to their local communities, 169 and maintaining
ownership limits to ensure the survival of locally-oriented news each vio-
late the licensees' First and Fifth Amendment rights. 7 ° Similarly, licensees
and proponents of a property regime for spectrum licenses raise similar
First and Fifth Amendment arguments in opposition to proposals to author-
ize new unlicensed underlays.171
The First Amendment claim against permitting new, non-exclusive uses
fails on several grounds. Even assuming that Red Lion and its progeny do
not apply, exclusive licensees suffer neither a diminution of their own
speech nor forced speech of others. They merely face potential competition
from additional speakers, the antithesis of a First Amendment violation.
72
More to the point, however, Red Lion does apply. 73 Accordingly, regula-
tion of licensees to promote the First Amendment interests of non-licensees
furthers the goals of the First Amendment. This precludes any claim of
exclusivity on the part of licensees, since, in the words of the Supreme
Court, "the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency
should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it ....
The Fifth Amendment takings claim fails on the express language of the
Communications Act and long-standing Supreme Court precedent. The
Communications Act provides no fewer than three times that a licensee has
no property interest in a license. 175 To avoid any argument that distribution
of licenses by auction somehow changed this presumption, the provision
providing the FCC with auction authority explicitly states that distribution
by auction creates no property, does not impact the ability of the FCC to
reclaim or regulate licenses, and that a license acquired via auction has no
168 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315 (2000) (providing access to political candidates).
169 Cf Office of Commc'ns of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1004-05
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
170 See sources cited supra note 148.
171 See, e.g., Second UWB R&O, supra note 91.
172 Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
113 See Red Lion,, 395 U.S. at 389-90.
114 Id. at 390-91.
' 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 309(h) (2000).
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greater or lesser rights than a license acquired by any other means. 76 The
Supreme Court has not only upheld this interpretation, it has held that
Congress had the authority to retroactively regulate and deny renewal of
licenses obtained prior to passage of the Federal Radio Act in 1927.177
On the other hand, critics of the First Amendment argument against per-
petual exclusive licenses have generally attacked a strawman. Such argu-
ments posit a mutually exclusive approach between "commons" and
"property" wherein the critics of unlicensed spectrum argue that technol-
ogy has not yet eliminated the need for exclusive licensing to use the spec-
trum productively. Therefore, they reason, the First Amendment claims of
commons proponents must fail in their entirety. 178 These arguments appear
to hinge on the idea that if any vestige of the scarcity argument remains-
to wit, that exclusivity remains necessary to ensure certain productive high
power uses of spectrum-it follows that all other First Amendment con-
cerns are somehow eliminated.
As discussed above, however, there is no contradiction between recog-
nizing that certain types of high power operation require exclusivity, while
applying standard First Amendment principles to the efforts of others to
speak in ways that, by their very nature, do not create harmful interference.
This is what ultimately distinguishes the First Amendment claims of those
communications via Part 15 devices from those, for example, made by
pirate radio operators. 179 The choice here is not whether the FCC should
permit five licensees or ten licensees, but whether to foreclose the right of
everyone else to speak through spectrum for the benefit of a handful of
authorized licensees. Where the FCC must limit access to spectrum, the
traditional calculus of NBC v. United States is applied: the FCC has broad
discretion to consider how best to promote the public interest while still
protecting the First Amendment rights of the vast majority of citizens ex-
cluded from licenses. 80 But, as in the instance of the competitive cable
overbuilder in Preferred Communications, where conditions do not require
exclusivity and its accompanying suppression of speech, the government
cannot invoke its general interest in promoting economic efficiency or
maximizing public revenue as a justification for government action.'8 '
176 §309(j)(6)(B)-(D).
177 See Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266, 282 (1933).
178 See, e.g. Jackson, et al, supra note 24, at 247.
179 See, e.g., United States v. Szoka, 260 F.3d 516, 519 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that illegal microbroadcasters are also called "pirates" by the FCC and the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters.).
180 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-27 (1943); see also FCC v. WNCN
Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981).
181 Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986). Where
colorable First Amendment issue exists, the mere rationality of government action will not
suffice. Instead, the intermediate scrutiny standard will apply, and the government must
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Defenders of the property approach have argued there is no difference,
from a First Amendment standpoint, between a cellular system allowing
100 million callers to speak freely to each other and greater access to unli-
censed spectrum.182 The problem with this argument is demonstrated by a
few real world examples. A subscriber to Cingular's Internet service can-
not use PayPal for online payments, but must instead use a service desig-
nated by Cingular.'83 A disgruntled customer seeking to create a new wire-
less network that would permit such access cannot build a competing net-
work to patronize an alternate pay service on any licensed band. Similarly,
a person wishing to broadcast local video or audio programming to his or
her neighborhood has no right to operate on the radio or television broad-
cast bands. That same person can, however, via unlicensed spectrum and
streaming technology, create the equivalent of a local radio or television
network. Even subscription to a local cellular phone company does not
provide this level of direct communication with a neighbor, as the wireless
operators reserve the right to limit streaming media through their systems.
C. Public Policy Favors a Shift to a "First Among Equals" Approach
First Amendment principles alone, therefore, would impose upon the
FCC an obligation to promote more unlicensed access to spectrum. Sig-
nificantly, however, an FAE approach that favors a gradual increase in the
ability of people to use unlicensed wireless services in addition to licensed
services serves the public interest policies identified by the Communica-
tions Act and the FCC.184 As an initial matter, the FAE approach has the
advantage of working within the context of existing law. Propertization,
assuming it is even constitutional, would demand statutory changes which,
as one supporter of a property approach has lamented, appear profoundly
unlikely. 185 Proposals to test property versus commons approaches for re-
prove a compelling state interest in favor of their action. Id.; see also sources cited supra
note 17.
182 See, e.g., Dale Hatfield & Phil Weiser, Toward Property Rights In Spectrum: The
Difficult Policy Choices Ahead (CATO Inst., Aug. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=6588; Speta, supra note 48.
183 Debate Continues over Internet's Future, NEWSFACTOR.COM, Aug 23, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.newsfactor.com/news/Debate-Continues-over-Internet-s-Future/story.
xhtml?storyid=I 1300ADUIVFZ.
184 See, e.g., In re Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encourag-
ing the Development of Secondary Markets, Policy Statement, 15 F.C.C.R. 24, 178 (Nov. 9,
2000). In its spectrum Policy Statement, the Commission enunciated a public policy of
promoting the public interest by "permit[ting] spectrum to flow more freely among users
and uses in response to economic demand." Id. 1 1.
185 See Speta, supra note 48, at 187-93.
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structuring of band allocation likewise require either legislation or radical
alteration of the FCC's existing rules.' 86
By contrast, the FCC can move forward with the FAE approach fairly
easily, by resolving the pending Interference Temperature docket and issu-
ing a policy statement similar to its policy statements promoting flexibility
in wireless services.'87 Compliance can be safeguarded by requiring mitiga-
tion measures, such as the inclusion of interference-avoidance and conten-
tion based protocols already required in various proceedings. 8 8 The FCC
could also mandate new measures to eliminate the need to create new
causes of action for enforcement, such as requiring devices to recognize a
"cease operation" signal or requiring devices to receive permission to op-
erate from some beacon or database.
189
The Communications Act contains a number of competing goals that
cumulatively serve the public interest. 9° Traditionally, these have included
promoting increased media diversity and heightened competition.' 9' Re-
cently, Congress amended the Act to eliminate discrimination in the de-
ployment of communications service and to promote the deployment of
broadband services to all Americans. 92 Section 257 of the Communica-
tions Act, which requires the FCC to review barriers to entry by small
businesses into the telecommunications industry every three years, and to
use its regulatory powers to reduce or eliminate these barriers, contains a
concise summary of these public interest goals to guide the FCC in its Tri-
enniel Review: "in carrying out subsection (a) of this subsection, the
186 See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communication, 16 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 25,66-67 (2002).
187 See infra Part III.
188 See, e.g., In re Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band; Rules for Wireless
Broadband Services in the 3650-3700 MHz Band; Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed
Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band; Amendment of the Commission's Rules
With Regard to the 3650-3700 MHz Government Transfer Band, Report and Order and
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 6502 (Mar. 10, 2005); In re Revision on
Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission's Rules to Permit Unlicensed National Information Infra-
structure (U-NIl) Devices in the 5 GHz Band, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 24,484 (Nov.
12, 2003).
189 Pierre de Vries, Populating the Vacant Channels 10 (New America Found., Working
Paper No. 14, 2006).
190 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, 160, 161, 201 (2000).
'9' FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Better Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978).
192 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 706, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 104 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-57); In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent
LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:
Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Re-
view - Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concern-
ing High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable
Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Inter-
net Over Cable Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986 (Aug. 5, 2005).
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Commission shall seek to promote the policies and purposes of this [Act]
favoring diversity of media voices, vigorous economic competition, tech-
nological advancement, and promotion of the public interest, convenience
and necessity."' 93 The FCC has repeatedly found that expanding Part 15
rules furthers the goals of encouraging new technologies and services to
the public.1
94
The paucity of service and lack of ownership opportunities for minority
communities further highlights the importance of unlicensed access. Pro-
viders of broadband and other advanced telecommunications services gen-
erally focus their attention on the wealthiest markets. 195 Furthermore, al-
though the Communications Act directs the Commission to use auctions to
promote "economic opportunity and competition.., by avoiding excessive
concentration of licenses and by disseminating licenses among a wide vari-
ety of applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone companies,
and businesses owned by members of minority groups and women,"'
96
ownership of telecommunications facilities remains excessively concen-
trated in the hands of a few, large corporations. 97
Despite the Commission's consistent efforts to develop bidding criteria
that will promote minority and small business ownership, spectrum auc-
tions continue to fail at these goals. A recent Center for American Progress
publication analyzing ten years of FCC auction data concluded that spec-
trum auctions increasingly serve to entrench incumbent interests and dis-
courage disruptive new entrants and ownership by minority-owned busi-
nesses. 198 The results of the FCC's most recent spectrum auction proved
consistent with these empirical studies of past auctions. In the 2006 Ad-
' 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2000).
194 See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Provide for Operation of Unli-
censed Nil Devices in the 5 GHz Range, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576, 8-18
(Jan. 9, 1997) (finding that expanding unlicensed access furthered interest of developing
new technologies, new services, new competitors, deployment of advanced telecommunica-
tions capabilities to all Americans-with an emphasis on rural and educational uses-and
helped fulfill the Commission's obligations under Section 257 to promote entry by small
businesses and to enhance diversity of information sources); In re Section 257 Proceeding
to Identify and Eliminate Market Entry Barriers for Small Businesses, Report, 12 F.C.C.R.
16,802, 202-05 (May 8, 1997). See also Carter, et al., supra note 52.
195 See Leonard M. Banes, Deregulatory Injustice and Electronic Redlining: The Color
of Access to Telecommunications, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 263,268(2004).
196 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C).
197 See, e.g., Eli M. Noam, Deregulation and Market Concentration: An Analysis of
Post-1996 Consolidation, 58 FED. COMM. L. J. 539, 541-43 (2006) (outlining empirical
evidence of the concentration of ownership in the telecommunications field).
198 Gregory F. Rose & Mark Lloyd, The Failure of FCC Spectrum Auctions (Ctr. for
Am. Progress, May 2006), available at
http://www.americanprogress.orglatf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A5 21 -
5D6FF2E06E03%7D/SPECTRUMAUCTIONSMAY06.PDF; see also Leonard M.
Banes & C. Anthony Bush, The Other Digital Divide: Disparity In the Auction of Wireless
Telecommunications, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 351 (2003).
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vanced Wireless Services Auction, the FCC offered for bid the largest
block of licenses in desirable frequencies below 2 GHz in years."' Incum-
bent wireless carriers, as well as a consortium consisting of the two largest
incumbent cable operators and one of the largest incumbent wireless carri-
ers, won the vast majority of licenses2
Empirical evidence to date, therefore, suggests that spectrum auctions do
little to create competition or provide opportunities for minority ownership.
To the contrary, the existing state of the wireless market and the last ten
years of auction data indicate that spectrum auctions are inimical to pro-
moting competition and diversity of ownership. This should raise grave
concerns for the FCC, as promoting competition and diversity of owner-
ship are core public interest goals of the Communications Act.
By contrast, granting unlicensed access would create immediate oppor-
tunities for deployment in any community by any entity, particularly com-
munities economically unattractive to incumbents. These communities will
be able to deploy needed systems themselves. The FCC has observed how
unlicensed access removes regulatory barriers to minority and small busi-
ness ownership of telecommunications facilities. 20 ' The Commission also
recognizes that expanding unlicensed access benefits Americans in both
urban and rural areas.20 2 Others, including the New America Foundation,
have extensively documented the benefits of unlicensed access. 20 3 Unli-
199 See Auction of Advanced Wireless Services Licenses Scheduled for June 29, 2006,
Public Notice, 21 F.C.C.R. 794 (Jan. 31, 2006).
200 Paul Davidson, Wireless Carriers Snap Up Federal Airwaves Licenses, USA TODAY,
Sept. 14, 2006, at 2B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/2006-09-14-
spectrum-usatx.htm?POE=TECISVA.
201 See In re Section 257 Triennial Report To Congress, Identifying and Eliminating
Market Entry Barriers For Entrepreneurs and Other Small Businesses, Report, 19 F.C.C.R.
3034, 9N 140-44 (Dec. 31, 2003); In re Section 257 Triennial Report To Congress, Identify-
ing and Eliminating Market Entry Barriers For Entrepreneurs and Other Small Businesses,
Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,376, 139 (July 28, 2002).
202 See, e.g., Carter, et al., supra note 52 at 22-23; Comm'r Kathleen Q. Abernathy,
FCC, The Harvest: Keynote Remarks at the Wireless Communications Association Interna-
tional Annual Conference (June 2, 2004); Comm'r Jonathon S. Adelstein, FCC, WISP
Forum, S.D. School of Mines and Tech. (May 25, 2004).
203 See, e.g., Matt Barranca, Unlicensed Wireless Broadband Profiles: Community, Mu-
nicipal and Commercial Success Stories (New Am. Found. Spectrum Policy Program,
Washington, D.C., Apr. 2004); William Lehr, Dedicated Lower Frequency Unlicensed
Spectrum: The Economic Case for Dedicated Unlicensed Spectrum Below 3 Ghz (New Am.
Found., Spectrum Series Working Paper No. 9, 2004); J.H. Snider, Reclaiming the Vast
Wasteland: the Economic Case for Reallocating the Unused Spectrum (White Space) Be-
tween Channel 2 and 51 to Unlicensed Service (New Am. Found., Working Paper No. 13,
2006); see also In re Establishment of and Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and
Manage Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fexed,
Mobile and Satellite Frequency Bands, Ex Parte Comments of Prometheus Radio Project,
Consumer Federation of America, Public Knowledge, Champaign-Urbana Community
Wireless Project, Benton Foundation, Electronic Frontier Foundation, New America Foun-
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censed access has become a mainstay of cities' efforts to provide afford-
able broadband services, so-called "muniwireless" or "unwired" cities.
2 4
Unlicensed spectrum also plays an increasing role in public safety. Unli-
censed devices provide interoperable voice, video, and data systems for
public safety entities, °5 and proved highly flexible and useful as a "force
multiplier" in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. °6
Opponents of enhancing unlicensed access in favor of a property regime
frequently counter that the level of government supervision and restriction
on use needed for managing spectrum as a commons on a large scale
would eliminate the advantages offered by common management. For ex-
ample, despite making a strong argument that it violates the First Amend-
ment for the government to keep spectrum idle merely to benefit incum-
bents, Benjamin supports a property-rights scheme and rejects the argu-
ments of the commons school on the grounds that a commons scheme
would inevitably result in a government-run network.2 °7 Many critics of
enhancing public access to spectrum by gradual expansion of Part 15 label
the "commons" as "communist" and "property" as "free market," a tactic
designed to sway policymakers with little technical or economic back-
ground who nevertheless hold deep feelings for the ideals of a free market
and an ownership society.0 8 This tactic is echoed by many of the critics of
enhancing public access to spectrum by gradual expansion of Part 15.209
It is unclear, however, why general access to wireless translates into
some sort of government-run network. The crux of the argument against
enhancing unlicensed access appears to be three-pronged: (a) under Part
15, the FCC sets technical parameters for devices and must certify that a
device will comply with the power limitations and other specifications; (b)
networks using unlicensed spectrum require some coordination, either vol-
untary or embedded as a technical feature in the device, to avoid interfer-
dation, The Dandin Group, Wireless Tech Radio and NYCWireless, ET Docket No. 03-237,
at 37 (June 18, 2004) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
204 Barranca, supra note 203, at 4-10, 19. For more information on "municipal wireless
broadband projects worldwide that are funded or supported by cities and towns," see the
Muniwireless Web site at http://muniwireless.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
205 See Barranca, supra note 203, at 17-18.
206 See Jeff R. Allen, Radio Response's Activities Following Hurricane Katrina, Feb. 24,
2006, http://www.nella.org/jra/dr/katrina/katrina-final-report.html#s31 (follow "Incident
Command System" hyperlink under "Table of Contents").
207 Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance, supra note 152.
208 Harold Feld & Gregory Rose, Metaphors, Myths, and Manipulation: How Telecom-
munications Consolidation is Rationalized 24-25 (Feb. 24, 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/595TPRC%20Current%2ODraft%
209-1 .pdf).
209 See In re Commission Seeks Public Comment on Spectrum Policy Task Force Re-
port, Reply Comments of IEEE 802.18 on the Report of the Commission's Spectrum Policy
Task Force, ET Docket No. 02-125, at 1, n.3 (Jan. 27, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System).
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ence with one another; and (c) networks must interconnect and run com-
mon protocols to communicate. °
However, these characteristics apply equally to licensed wireless net-
works, unlicensed networks, and wireline networks. The FCC sets power
limits and other technical specifications for licensed services as well as
unlicensed services. Interconnection requires both coordination and com-
mon protocols. In the unlicensed space, one finds a variety of both proprie-
tary and open standards-all developed by private parties. If anything,
unlicensed spectrum provides a less controlled environment for these pro-
tocols than the licensed environment, given the greater number of uses,
potential users, and low barriers to entry. Indeed, the FCC's most recent
foray into non-exclusive licensing, the 3650-3700 MHz service, makes
abundantly clear that the FCC has no interest in setting a single, govern-
ment standard. 21 ' To the contrary, although various industry parties have
asked the FCC to authorize a particular protocol as the official coordina-
tion technique,1 2 the FCC has so far refused to do so. Moreover, to the
extent property advocates argue that the FCC should cease to certify and
set limits for licensed services, this constitutes a radical departure from the
current regime. Yet, as some supporters of the property regime have re-
cently admitted, the government cannot be easily removed from regulation
even in a property regime.213 To the extent unlicensed networks are "gov-
ernment networks," licensed networks are equally "public" rather than
"private" in nature.
Some additional public policy arguments frequently raised against ex-
panding any further general access to spectrum deserve brief rebuttal. For
example, it has been argued that increasing unlicensed access to spectrum
constitutes a windfall for equipment manufacturers in violation of the
windfall provisions of Section 309.214 This argument is based on the notion
that equipment manufacturers will make money if the FCC enhances the
ability to use unlicensed spectrum, constituting a windfall. By this defini-
tion, of course, any enhancement of an ability to use spectrum produces a
windfall. We do not think of Seimens, Motorola, or other equipment manu-
facturers as enjoying a windfall from the licenses acquired by Cingular
Wireless or other licensees. If anything, the windfall effect is higher where
a licensee acquires a license at auction, and thus, creates a new equipment
market. At least in the unlicensed case, equipment riders are not free riders.
210 See Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance, supra note 152.
211 Id. at 2053.
212 Id. at 2051-53.
213 See Hatfield & Weiser, supra note 182.
214 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(E) (2000) (requiring spectrum auction rules to be pre-
scribed in such a way as to "require such transfer disclosures and antitrafficking restrictions
and payment schedules as may be necessary to prevent unjust enrichment as a result of the
methods employed to issue licenses and permits."); Goodman, supra note 155, at 217.
20061
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
At its heart, the idea that enhancing unlicensed use constitutes a windfall
to equipment manufacturers appears to derive from the idea that spectrum
rights belonged either to some licensee or to the government and that there-
fore any ability to make a profit without "paying" the previous "owner" is
wrong. Both of these conceptions suffer from the same basic fallacy: the
assumption that spectrum a thing. There cannot logically be a transfer of
spectrum when no licensee ever had an exclusive right, nor can it be a
windfall when it is a benefit open to everyone.
Similarly, the classic notion embodied in the Communications Act
against "unjust enrichment" cannot apply when everyone has an equal op-
portunity to enjoy the benefit. Where a licensee receives an exclusive right
for free or at a discount on a promise to provide a public service, then sells
that right for a tidy profit, the concept of unjust enrichment is at the ex-
pense of the public is plain. But where everyone can claim the same right
to get equipment certified, how is it "unjust" for those who chose to exer-
cise that right to sell equipment at a profit?
There is also the economic objection that a property model would natu-
rally provide incentives for deploying networks and valuing spectrum. 15
Such contentions are usually theoretical and disregard the empirical evi-
dence that private parties and others continue to invest a great deal in unli-
censed spectrum. 216 One need not resort to the more theoretical works of
Cooper 17 and Benkler218 to observe that the market continues to refute the
notion that unlicensed spectrum access has economic utility and that it can
coexist comfortably with exclusivity.219
Finally, defenders of the property regime argue that if commons were
genuinely efficient, spectrum property owners would create private com-
mons that would capture these efficiencies. 220 The idea that one can wish
away the transaction costs associated with a private commons, or the im-
pact such transaction costs would have on the economics of thin-margin
ventures such as wireless broadband, and ignore the likelihood that such
private owners would seek to limit uses to avoid competition, would nor-
mally lie in the world of humor or fantasy were it not repeated so of-
215 Digital Age Communications Act ("DACA"), Report From the Working Group on
New Spectrum Policy, The Progress and Freedom Foundation (March 2006), available at
http://www.pff.org (follow "search" hyperlink; search "Report From the Working Group on
New Spectrum Policy"; then follow "DACA Spectrum 1.0.doc" hyperlink).
216 Dr. Mark Cooper, The Economics of Collaborative Production in the Spectrum Com-
mons, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School (Jan. 23-24, 2006) (unpub-




218 See YocHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SocIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1-2 (2006).
219 See analysis of the possibility for coexistence, supra Part II(C).
220 See Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 142.
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ten. 221Again, however, empiricism provides a convenient counter-proof.
Numerous companieshave sought to invest in development of new equip-
ment for previously existing and newly created opportunities for non-
exclusive spectrum use. Given the willingness to use unlicensed spectrum
when freely available, it seems likely that the failure to see development of
private commons results from flaws in the private aspect rather than the
commons aspect of the private commons.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMONG EQUALS APPROACH
The FCC has an obligation to foster non-exclusive access to spectrum.
When weighing the interests of licensed and unlicensed spectrum users, the
FCC should adopt a bias in favor of maximizing the number of users who
can utilize spectrum on a non-exclusive basis. When rejecting proposals
for non-exclusive access, the FCC should properly place the burden of
demonstrating a genuine risk of harmful interference on those seeking to
block such access.222
As others have observed, defining "harmful interference" poses chal-
lenges.223 The courts have generally given the FCC flexibility, provided
that the FCC adequately explains how it concluded whether potential inter-
ference is or is not "harmful., 224 As a general principle, the FCC has
looked to the nature of the service to determine what constitutes "harmful"
interference. When evaluating possible interference risk from the proposed
Multichannel Video Data and Distribution Service, for example, the FCC
determined that the primary licensee, a Direct Broadcast Service, was very
reliable.225 Even so, users were unlikely to notice the small number of mo-
mentary interruptions that a worst case projection indicated might occur.226
When the FCC evaluated the potential entry of a new low power FM ser-
221 This argument is rather like the old joke asking: How many Libertarians does it take
to change a lightbulb? Answer: None. If the market wanted a working light bulb, the light
bulb would be working. Author unknown.
222 Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000) (allocating upon those opposing proposed new tech-
nologies the burden of proving that the technologies are not in the public interest).
223 Margie, supra note 82.
224 See Northpoint Technology, Ltd v. FCC, 414 F.3d 61, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2005); AT&T
Wireless Services, Inc. v. FCC, 270 F.3d 959, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(remanding for better
explanation).
22 See Northpoint, 414 F.3d at 66 (citing In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the
Commission's Rules to Permit Operation of NGSO FSS Systems Co-Frequency with GSO
and Terrestrial Systems in the Ku-Band Frequency Range; Amendment of the Commis-
sion's Rules to Authorize Subsidiary Terrestrial Use of the 12.2-12.7 GHz Band by Direct
Broadcast Satellite Licensees and Their Affiliates; Applications of Broadwave USA, PDC
Broadband Corporation, and Satellite Receivers, Ltd. to Provide A Fixed Service in the 12.2-
12.7 GHz Band, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 16




vice, the FCC considered that the majority of people listening to FM radio
were accustomed to making minor adjustments in their antenna position as
transitory environmental issues routinely interfere with reception.227
Accordingly, a first positive step in advancing efficient use of spectrum
that maximizes the number of spectrum users is to adopt a suitable metric
to determine the extent to which non-interfering underlays can coexist with
exclusive licensed services. The Commission proposed just such a metric
in 2003, the so-called "interference temperature. 228 Unsurprisingly, this
metric met considerable resistance from incumbents. As a result, the FCC
has allowed the proceeding to languish. Approving the interference tem-
perature concept would serve as a good first step in broadening spectrum
access. Similarly, protests from incumbent licensees 229 have thwarted ef-
forts to promote frequency-agile radios-so called cognitive or "smart"
radios-that dynamically seek out available frequencies for communica-
tions.230 Likewise, efforts to use open frequencies in assigned bands that
are either open from lack of interest or deliberately left unused as guard
bands, the so-called "white spaces," has met stiff resistance from incum-
bents eager to guard the scarcity of "their" spectrum.
When evaluating new opportunities such as smart radios or white spaces,
the FCC should place a considerable burden on licensees to demonstrate
that a real danger of harmful interference exists. Even then, the FCC
should determine if some modification of the proposal or inclusion of post
hoc remedies, such as a mandatory signal to cease operation or requiring a
device to receive permission to operate from a beacon, can provide suitable
mitigation against the risk of harmful interference. The objective should be
to find a way to expand the public's access to spectrum, rather than to try
to find ways to maintain spectrum scarcity.
Finally, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 257, the FCC must evaluate the state of
the telecommunications market every three years, and use its regulatory
powers to remove barriers to entry by small businesses. This triennial re-
227 In re Creation of Low Power Radio Service, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205,
86 (Jan. 20, 2000).
228 See Interference Temperature NOI, supra note 29, 1.
229 See, e.g., Kelly Niknejad, Cognitive radio: a smarter way to use radio frequencies,
Columbia News Service, Apr. 19, 2005, http://jscms.jrn.columbia.edu/cns/2005-04-
19/niknejad-smartradio ("Even with the new technology, sharing is meeting resistance from
those who have exclusive use of prime swaths of spectrum, or what cognitive radio propo-
nents have dubbed 'beachfront' real estate."). In March 2005, the Commission adopted
rules to modify and clarify some of the authorization requirements for cognitive radios, but
declined to adopt specific rules regarding the leasing of spectrum by licensees for use by
cognitive radio operations. In re Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reli-
able Spectrum Use Employing Cognitive Radio Technologies, Report and Order, 20
F.C.C.R. 5046 (Mar. 10, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-57AI.pdf
230 See Steven Ashley, Cognitive Radio, Sci. AM., Feb. 20, 2006, for an in-depth expla-
nation of cognitive radio technology.
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view process provides an excellent opportunity for the Commission to ac-
tively seek new opportunities for enhancing unlicensed access. This could
include opening new bands to underlays, or simply increasing the available
power or capabilities of already approved devices. By contrast, where li-
censees seek to open new spectrum to exclusive licensing, or pursue
changes to enhance licensed services at the expense of non-exclusive ser-
vices, the FCC should view such requests with disfavor. The Commission
should favor exclusivity only where it is absolutely essential to serve the
public interest. Public safety services, for example, should be given special
protection. Even here, however, permanent prohibitions on sharing li-
censed and unlicensed services in the same band should be avoided. As
technology will continue to permit greater sharing of access without the
risk of harmful interference, a permanent ban may foreclose opportunities
for synergies between exclusive and non-exclusive services.231
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over spectrum reform has too often devolved into a false di-
chotomy between property and commons approaches to spectrum alloca-
tion. Rather than seek to impose sudden, radical change on the system of
spectrum management, leading to unknown consequences, the FCC should
adopt an evolutionary approach. By rethinking its spectrum hierarchy and
elevating Part 15 as first among equals to licensed services, the FCC can
affect real change in spectrum management without the need for new legis-
lation or radical restructuring of existing bands. Furthermore, favoring
non-exclusive uses over exclusive uses serves the First Amendment and
the policies of the Communications Act. Such a change lies within the
FCC's existing authority. Indeed, pending FCC proceedings like those
discussed above present the FCC with an opportunity to take a first step in
the evolutionary change that will facilitate a spectrum policy suitable for
the Twenty-first Century.
231 For example, public safety services in the 4.9 Ghz band have already benefitted from
proximity to unlicensed 5.3 Ghz band. In re The 4.9 GHz Band Transferred from Federal
Government Use, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 04-265, WT Docket No. 00-32,
5 (Nov. 12, 2004).
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